A.K.
Gopalan v. The State of Madras. Union Of India: Intervener, 1950 SCR 88.
(May
19, 1950). http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=1251
The
plaintiff was detained under the “Preventive Detention Act (Act IV of 1950).
The plaintiff applied under article 32 of the constitution for a writ of
hapeas corpus for release from detention, on the grounds that the act was
unconstitutional, and went against article 13, 19, 21, 22. He claimed that
his detention was illegal.
The
court held that the act, with the exception of section 14, was not in
“contravene” of the articles of constitution, and since the invalidity of
section 14 did not affect the validity of the whole act, the detention was
not illegal.
“Section
14 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, contravenes the provisions of Art.
9.9. (5) of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits a person detained from
disclosing to the Court the grounds on which a detention order has been made
or the representation made by him against the order of detention, and is to
that extent ultra vires and void.”
|
The
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and others., 1954 SCR 587.
December
17, 1953. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=984
|
Pandit
M.S.M. Sharma v.
Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and others., 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 806. December 12, 1958. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=440
“The
plaintiff petitioner is the Editor of the English daily newspaper
“Searchlight of Patna.” The Secretary of the Patna Legislative Assembly
called him to address the Committee of Privileges of the Assembly about why
breached the privileges of the Speaker and the Assembly by publishing in its
entirety a speech delivered in the Assembly by a member. The speaker of the
Assembly had asked for portions of the speech to be expunged. The plaintiff
petitioner now contends that the notice given to him by the respondent was in
violation of his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under
Art. 19(1)(a) and of the protection of his personal liberty under Art. 21 of
the Indian Constitution. He held that an editor of a newspaper was entitled
“to all the benefits of the freedom of the Press.” The respondents, the
legislature, relied on Art. 194(3) Of the Constitution to claim that the
proceedings in the House just as those in the British House of Commons were
not usually meant to be published. Furthermore the respondents held that the
plaintiff could not publish parts of speech that were directed to be expunged
and they were not part of an official report.
Holding:
Since the Bihar Legislature had made no law governing its powers and
privileges under Entry 39 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution, the question at hand was were the powers, privileges and
immunities of the House at the time of the commencement of the Constitution.
The liberty of the Press is implicit in the freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed to a citizen under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and that must
include the freedom of propagation of ideas ensured by the freedom of circulation.
“The effect in law of the order of the Speaker to expunge a portion of the
speech of a member might be as if that portion had not been spoken and a
report of the whole speech despite the speaker's order might be regarded as a
perverted and unfaithful report and Prima facie constitute a breach of the
privilege of the Assembly. Whether there had in fact been a breach of the
privilege of the Assembly was, however, a matter for the Assembly alone to
judge,” not the legislature. Therefore the court issues a Writ of
Prohibition, to restrain the “respondents from proceeding against the
petitioner for the alleged breach of privilege by publishing in the issue of
the " Searchlight ",
dated
May 31, 1957, an account of the debate of the House (Legislative Assembly,
Bihar) of May 30, 1957.”
|
Sardar
Syenda Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay, 11962 SCR Supl. (2) 496, 962 AIR 853.
January
9, 1962. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=4022.
The
plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the Bombay Prevention of
Excommunication Act, 1949 (Bom. 42 of 1949), it is provided that
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom or usage for the
time being in force, to the contrary, no excommunication of member of any
community shall be valid and shall
be
of any effect." It was enacted to keep with the “changing times” and
therefore it was in the best public interest, “to stop the practice of
excommunication prevalent in certain communities.” The definition of the word
"community" contained in the Act includes the religious
denomination of Dawoodi Bohras.
Holding:
The court held that excommunication was part of the Dawoodi Bohra community,
and “that the exercise of the power of excommunication by its religious head
on religious grounds formed part of the management of its affairs in matters
of religion and the impugned Act in making even such excommunication invalid
infringed the right of the community” under the Constitution. “The purity of
the fellowship is secured by the removal of persons who had rendered
themselves unfit and unsuitable for membership of the sect.” The right to
excommunicate “for the purpose of ensuring the preservation of the community,
has therefore a prime significance in the religious life of every member of
the group.” Therefore a legislation that penalizes such power, cannot “be
sustained as a measure of the social welfare or social reform without” being
unconstitutional.
|
Kameshwar
Prasad and others v. The State of Bihar and Another. 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369, 1962 AIR 1166.
February
22, 1962. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=3955.
The
plaintiff holds that the “Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules” which
states “No government servant shall participate in any demonstration or
resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his
conditions of service,” is unconstitutional. The court held that the part
about prohibiting “any form of demonstrations” was in violation of the
plaintiff’s rights under article 19 of the constitution. However, the act
cannot be struck down because it prohibits a strike, because there is “no
fundamental right to resort to a strike.”
|
Smt.
Sarla Mudgal, President Kalyani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1995 SCC (3) 635, 1995 AIR 1531.
October
5, 1995. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=10742
This
is a freedom of religion case. There was an attempt to create a unified
personal law for all citizens of India, which mainly effects marriage. But
the first PM did not think fitting of the time pass such a law. This case
brings to the Supreme Court, to bring about this law. The court held: “
Freedom is the core of our culture. Even the slightest deviation shakes the
social fiber. `But religious practices, volatile of human
rights
and dignity and sacerdotal suffocation of essentially civil and material
freedoms, are not autonomy but oppression'. Therefore, a unified code is
imperative both
for
protection of the oppressed and promotion of national unity and solidarity.
But the first step should be to rationalize the personal law of the
minorities to develop
religious
and cultural amity. The Government would be well advised to entrust the
responsibility to the Law Commission which may in consultation with
Minorities Commission examine the matter and bring about the comprehensive
legislation in
keeping
with modern day concept of human rights for women. The Government may also
consider feasibility of appointing a Committee to enact Conversion of
Religion Act, immediately, to check the abuse of religion by any person. The
law may provide that every citizen who changes his religion cannot marry
another wife unless he divorces his first wife. The provision should be made
applicable to every person whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian
or a Sikh or a Jain or a Budh. Provision may be made for maintenance and
succession etc. also to avoid clash of interest after death. This would go a
long way to solve the problem and pave the way for a unified civil code.
|
Vishaka
v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R.
1997 S.C. 3011
|
Apparel
Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra,
(1999) 1 S.C.C. 759.
The
court found that there is a distinction between attempt to molest and
completed act erroneous in context of dismissal of employee for sexual
harassment.
|
Narashimaha
Murthy v. Susheelabai (Smt),
(1996) 3 S.C.C. 644.
The
court upheld gender-differential statutory coparcenary division.
|
Narmada
Bachao Aandolan v Union of India and Others
AIR 2000 SC 3751.
October
18, 2000.
The
issue was whether the displacement of indigenous and tribal populations in
relation to the building of a dam on the Narmada River violates their rights
under the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1957 (ILO Convention
107).
The
court held that treaties can be read into domestic laws of India. However the
removal of the tribal people with a program of rehabilitation is not in
violation of the convention. The land allotted to the tribal people should at
the least be of equal quality. Displacement of the tribal people is not a
violation of their fundamental human rights.
|
Kharak
Singh v. State of UP, 1 SCR
332 (1964).
The
Indian Constitution does not explicitly recognize the right to privacy. This
Supreme Court case was to recognize that there is a right to privacy implicit
in article 21 of the Constitution, which states “No person shall be deprive
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by
law.” The court ruled that the police visits to a person’s house at night to
verify his whereabouts was an invasion of privacy.
|
Shri
Ramakant Rai and Health Watch U.P. and Bihar v. Union of India and Others ,
Women
have the human right to voluntary sterilization services that are not
coercive, discriminatory or violent. The court
asked state governments to take steps to regulate doctors and other providers
who perform sterilization procedures.
|
I.C.
Golaknath & others v. State of Punjab & others. , 1967 AIR 1643, 1967 SCR (2) 762.
February
27, 1967.
“Fundamental
Rights cannot be abridged or taken away by the amending procedure in Ail. 368
of the Constitution. An amendment to the Constitution is 'law' within the
meaning of Art. 13(2) and is therefore subject to Part III of the
Constitution.”
|
H.H.
Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji RaoscIndia Bahadur v. Union of India , 1971 SCR (3) 9.
December
15, 1970.
|
Ediga
Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh
, 1974 AIR 799, 1974 SCR (3) 329.
February
11, 1974.
This
is a case dealing with the death penalty, and commutation of the death
sentence to a life imprisonment for a woman who committed murder. Her tribal
ethnicity and gender figured heavily in the Supreme Court’s analysis.
“In
India the subject of capital punishment has abortively come before Parliament
earlier, although our social scientists have not made any sociological or
statistical study in depth yet. On the statutory side there has been a
significant change since India became free. Under s.367(5) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, as it stood before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955, the
normal rule was to sentence to death a person convicted for murder and to
impose the lesser sentence for reasons to be recorded in writing. By
amendment, this provision was deleted with the result that the court is now
free to award either death sentence or life imprisonment, unlike formerly
when death was the rule and life term the exception, for recorded reasons. In
the new Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 a great change has overtaken the law.
Section 354(3) reads : When the conviction is for an offence punishable with
death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for
a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence
awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such
sentence." The unmistakable shift in legislative emphasis is that life
imprisonment for murder is the rule and capital sentence the exception to
be.” The court decides that social and economic factors play a role in
commuting death sentences to life imprisonment, and decided that in this case
the sentence could be commuted.
|
Jagdish
Prasad v. The state of Bihar and another.
1974 SCR (3) 369.
February
13, 1974.
Case
on unlawful detention for reasons stated as being “anti-social” activities.
|
Nawabkhan
Abbaskhan v. The state of Gujarat
. 1974 AIR 1471, 1974 SCR (3) 427.
February
19, 1974.
An
“externment” order which infringed a fundamental freedom passed in violation
of the audi alteram partem rule was a 'nullity. A determination is no
determination if it is
contrary
to the constitutional mandate of Art. 19.” Any order made without hearing
the
party affected is void and ineffectual to bind parties from the beginning if
the in jury is to a constitutionally guaranteed right. May be that in
ordinary legislation or at
common
law a Tribunal having Jurisdiction and failing to hear the parties may commit
an illegality which may render the proceedings voidable when a direct attack
was made thereon by way of appeal, revision or review, but nullity is the
consequence of unconstitutionality and so the order of an administrative
authority charged with the duty of complying with natural justice in the
exercise of power before restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is
void abinitio and of no legal efficacy.”
|
The
Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society & Anr. Etc. v. State of Gujarat
& Anr. , 1975 SCR (1) 173.
April
26, 1974.
The
petitioner contended that as religious and Linguistic minorities they had a
fundamental
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice as
also the right to affiliation. The court held “There, is no fundamental right
to affiliation. But recognition or affiliation is necessary for a meaningful
exercise of the right to establish and administer educational institutions.
|
Govind
v. State of Madhya Pradesh.
, 1975 SCR (3) 946.
March
18, 1975.
The
petitioner was placed on a surveillance registry and regularly surveillanced,
pursuant to a regulation created by the government of Madhya Pradesh. He is
challenging the validity of the law that gives discretion to the district
superintendent to determine whether a person is “leading a life of crime” that
is dangerous enough to put his/her name on the registry. Such surveillance
includes “domiciliary visits.” The court held the law legal and in accordance
with the police act, since the only purpose was to see whether the
“individual is at home or gone out of it for commission of offences.” However
the court warned that it behooved the state to revise its police surveillance
in order to conform with constitutional rights.
|
State
of Kerala & ANR. V. N.M. Thomas & Ors. , 1976 SCR (1) 906.
November
19, 1975.
“The
classification of employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes for allowing them an extended period of two years for passing the
special tests for promotion is a just and reasonable classification haring
rational nexus to the object of providing equal opportunity for all citizens
in matters relating to employment or appointment to public offices.”
|
Rohtas
Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union & Ors. 1976 SCR (3) 12.
December
18, 1975.
Article
226(1A) reiterates that writ power can be exercised against any person by
reference to the residence of such person. Writ power is necessary to counter
any possible violations of human rights.
|
Additional
Distrcit Magistrate Jabalpur v. S.S. Shukla etc. 1976 SCR 172.
April
28, 1976.
The
court held: “In view of the Presidential order dated 27 June 1975 no person
has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a
High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to
challenge the legality of an, order of detention on the ground that the order
is not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by
malafides factual or legal or is based on extraneous consideration.”
This
case is a blemish in Indian jurisprudence history, when it suspended the writ
of habeas corpus during the Indian “Emergency,” and failed to regulate
government action.
|
Satwant
Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, Government of
India, New Delhi & Ors.(1)
. 1967 SCR (2) 525.
April
10, 1967.
“Court
ruled by majority that the expression "personal liberty" which
occurs in article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to travel abroad
and that no person can be deprived of that right except according to
procedure established by law.”
|
Nandini
Satpathy v. Dani P.L. and Anr.
1978 SCR (3) 608.
April
7, 1978
Case
dealing with self incrimination.
|
National
Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 1996 SCC (1) 742.
January
9, 1996
The
court’s judgment secured the human rights of indigenous peoples in Arunachal
Pradesh. The Court ruled for the end of the illegal evictions of Chakmas and
Hajongs from their homes and for their protection by paramilitary means if
necessary.
|
Prakash
Singht & ors. v. Union of, Writ
Petition (civil) 310 of 1996.
September
22, 2006.
Supreme
Court decision on police reforms.
|
Vishaka
v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997
SC 3011, (1998) 3 Butterworths Human Rights Cases 261. http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=13856
This case for the first time explicitly described what constitutes
sexual harassment. Found sexual harassment to be in violation of fundamental
rights to gender equality and the right to life and liberty.
|
Apparel
Export Promotion Council v Chopra,
Civ App Nos 226-227 of 1999.
The
court applied the sexual harassment jurisprudence developed in Vishaka v.
State of Rajasthan for the first time.
|
Zahira
Habibulla H Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., Appeal (crl.) 446-449 of 2004.
Famous
“Best Bakery” case that dealt with the Gujarat riots of 2002. The court
ordered new investigations, and for the retrials to be outside of Gujarat for
those individuals who had been acquitted in a court in Gujarat. The case
dealt with the communal unrest between Hindus and Muslims, and the Gujarat
government’s part and inaction in fairly investigating.
|
Madhav
Hayawandanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra , 1979 SCR (1) 192.
August
17, 1978.
Holding:
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except
according to procedure established by law. One component of 'fair procedure'
is natural justice. Generally speaking and subject to just exceptions, at
least a single right of appeal on facts, where criminal conviction is fraught
with long loss of liberty, is basic to civilized jurisprudence. It is
integral to fair procedure, natural justice and normative universality save
in special cases like the original tribunal being a high bench sitting on a
collegiate basis. In short, a first appeal from the Sessions Court to the
High Court, as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code, manifests this value
upheld in Art.” Therefore the state has to provide service of a copy of the
judgment to the prisoner in time to file an appeal and provisions for “free
legal services to a prisoner who is indigent or otherwise disabled from
securing legal assistance where the ends of justice call for such service.”
|
Moti
Ram & Ors v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
1979 SCR (1) 335.
August
24, 1978.
The
case dealt with reforming bail laws.
|
Sunil
Batra etc. v. Delhi Administration and ors. etc., 1979 SCR (1) 392.
August
30, 1978.
This
case examined the fundamental rights of those imprisoned, especially those
who were awaiting the death sentence. Specifically it addressed the living
conditions of prisoners. It ruled that according to the penal codes, solitary
confinement cannot be authorized by a prison official. It is to be authorized
by court mandate only.
|
Rajendra
Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
1979 SCR (3) 78.
February
9, 1979.
The
case dealt with the death penalty, and when it should or should not be
imposed. Need to have special reasons to impose the death penalty. The
special reasons should relate to the criminal. The court looked at the
developing jurisprudence and laws on the death penalty in the United States
and the United Kingdom in its analysis.
|
Hussainara
Khatoon & Ors v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, 1979 SCR (3) 169.
February
12, 1979.
The
case dealt with the unlawful detention of prisoners including men, women and
children in jails for several years without any due process or trial. The
court reaffirmed that holding people behind bars without trial for long
period of time did not conform to the “reasonable, just or fair” requirement
of article 21 of the constitution. The court discussed the fundamental right
to speedy trial and the right to representation, specifically the right to
free legal representation to the poor.
|
Nimeon
Sangma & Ors. v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Meghalaya & ors., 1979 SCR (3) 785.
April
3, 1979.
Another
case dealing with illegal detention and lack of expeditious trials.
|
Jolly
George Verghese & anr. v. The Bank of Cochin, 1980 SCR (2) 913.
February
4, 1980.
Case
deals with the international law norm of not imprisoning a person “merely on
the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation.” Article 11
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The court
held: “Superficially read [the law in question] implies that if at any time
after the passing of an old decree the judgment-
debtor
had come by some resources and had not discharged the decree he could be
detained in prison even though at that later point of time he was found to be
penniless. This is not a sound position, apart from being inhuman going by
the standards of Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Article 21. A simple default to discharge is not enough.
There must be some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference to pay, some
deliberate or recusant disposition in the past or alternatively current means
to pay the decree or a substantial part of it. The provision emphasizes the
need to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal on
demand verging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree.”
|
People's
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,
(1997) 3 S.C.C. 43.
Vellore
Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India,
(1996) Supp. 5 S.C.R. 241.
A.P.
Pollution Control Board v. Nayudu,
1999 S.O.L. No.53
Cases
all dealing with the application of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Holding that the human rights provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be the basis for a
cause of action under the Constitution of India.
|
Sher
Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.
1983 S.C. 465
Holding
that courts must take “delay” into account when imposing the death penalty.
|
Pai
Found. v. Karnataka, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 481
The
court explains the different roles protective discrimination laws and
measures play in the history of the Indian democracy.
|
Chairman,
Ry. Bd. v. Das, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 988
Apparel
Exp. Promotion Council v. Chopra,
A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625
Vishaka
v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011
In
these cases the court has approached the issue of gender based violence by
relying on the international legal norm of gender violence being an issue of
equality, and that freedom of it is a fundamental right protected under the
constitution. Specifically the court had tried to incorporate CEDAW into its
analysis.
|
Gov't
of Andhra Pradesh v. Vijayakumar,
A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1648
The
court upheld affirmative action for women in public employment.
|
Saran
v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 820
|
Agarwal
v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1440.
Reddy
v. Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 4 S.C.C. 439
Holding
that reservation seats for women in municipal boards and boards of
cooperative societies are protected under article 15(3) of the Indian
Constitution.
|
Gupta
v. Uttar Pradesh, (2005) 5 S.C.C. 172
Lakshmi
v. Punjab Univ . , A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3331
Union
of India v. Prabhakaran, (1997)
11 S.C.C. 638
Pansari
v. Orissa, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1531
Chandra
v. Bihar, 1996 A.I.R. 88
Kavitha
v. Tamil Nadu, 1992 A.I.R. 359
Cases
all upholding the reservation of seats for women in public institutions.
|
Ara
v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3551
Singh
v. Ramendri Smt., A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 952
Satpathy
v. Dixit, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3348
Sesharathamma
v. Manikyamma, (1991) 3 S.C.R. 717
Kaushal
v. Kaushal, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1807.
Cases in which the court interpreted ambiguous laws in a manner that was protectionist towards women-such as labeling women as being destitute after divorce. |
Mohd.
Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945
The
case of Shah Bano is famous because the court determined that a Muslim woman
who was divorced should be paid alimony. The case created a lot of
controversy since Muslim religious leaders did not want the court to
interpret religious concepts in the area of family without religious
authority.
|
Lily
Thomas v. Union of India, A.I.R.
2000 S.C. 1650
Smt.
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India,
A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1531
Cases
dealing with the right of Hindu men to covert to Islam to avail of Muslim
protectionist marriage laws, such as exercising polygamy.
|
Bijoe
Emmanuel v. State of Kerala,
A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 748
The
Indian national anthem was to be given its due respect, but did not have to
be sung by those who objected to it on religious ground.
|
Ismail
Faruqui v. Union of India, A.I.R.
1995 S.C. 605.
Acharya
Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Comm'r of Police, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 51, P 17.
Cases where the court ruled on whether certain religious acts were an “essential practice” of the religion. |
S.P.
Gupta v. Union of India (1982),
69 A.I.R. 149
Holding:
“Where a society has chosen to accept democracy as its creedal faith, it is
elementary that its citizens ought to know what their government is doing. .
. . No democratic government can survive without accountability and the basic
postulate of accountability is that the people should have information about
the functioning of the government. It is only if people know how government
is functioning that they can fulfill the role that democracy assigns to them
and make democracy an effective participatory democracy.” Recognizes that
full right to information is part of right to freedom of speech.
|
Bal
Patil v. Union of India, (2005)
6 S.C.C. 690
The
court ruled that followers of the Jain religion would not be considered a
religious minority, since the court merely sees the religion as a “reformist
movement amongst Hindus.”
|
Olga
Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.,
AIR 1986 Supreme Ct. 18.
Protection
of slum dwellers and pavement dwellers from eviction unless suitable
accommodation is provided.
|
C.
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoli,
(1996) 8 S.C.C. 525.
Holding
that “personal laws conferring inferior status on women is anathema to
equality.”
|
Zoroastrian
Coop. Hous. Soc'y Ltd. v. Dist. Registrar Coop. Soc'y, (2005) 5 S.C.C. 632
A
particular religious community could build an enclosed community residential
colony restricted to only its own members.
|
State
of West Bengal v. Ashutosh Lahiri,
A.I.R 1995 S.C. 464
Hanif
Qureshi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R.
1958 S.C. 731
Gujarat
v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat,
(2005) 8 S.C.C. 534
Cases
that disallowed the slaughtering of cows even for religious purposes and non
Hindu religious holidays.
|
Krishna
Singh v. Mathura Ahir, A.I.R.
1980 S.C. 707
In
interpreting Hindu laws the court was to not use its own modern interpretation
of norms, but the interpretation derived from authoritative Hindu sources.
|
People's
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors. (S.C. 2001)Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196/2001.
Held
that governments have an obligation to ensure that people who cannot feed
themselves adequately are not malnourished or exposed to starvation.
|
Union
of India v. Ass'n for Democratic Reforms,
2 L.R.I. 305 (2002).
Mohinder
Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, 1 S.C.C. 405.
Cases
in which the court held that the Election Commission had the obligation to
provide free and fair elections.
|
Sheela
Barse v. Union of India, 3
S.C.C. 632 (1986).
Kali
Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh,
(1973) 2 S.C.C. 808.
Chatisgarh
Mukti Morcha v. State of M. P . , (1996) 1996 Cr.L.J. 2239.
State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 S.C.C. 172
Cases
holding that the scope of right to life and liberty extends to the right of
access to justice under article 21 of the constitution, and extending to the
right to presumptive innocence, public trial and permissibility of evidence
in trial.
|
Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala,
(1973) 4 SSC 225.
Right
to life implies right to a basic “healthy life” as provided under the constitution.
|
Mehta
v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996)
Supp. 9 S.C.R. 726.
The
case recognized the need to penalize violators of the child labor prohibition
and regulation act of 1986, and fine violators payable towards the
rehabilitation of child victim. The court also implored the national and
state governments to work together to prevent child labor.
|
Unni
Krishnan v. State of A.P . AIR 1997 SC 449.
Right
to free and compulsory education for children and the protection of children
from exploitation.
|
Visaka
v. State of Rajastan, AIR
1997 SC 3014
Extended
the right to not be sexually harassed and called for prevention of sexual
harassment.
|
Dhirendra
Chamoli v. State of U.PI, 1986 1
SCC 637
The
Supreme Court ruled the right to equal pay for equal work.
|
Paschim
Bang Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of W.B.
1996 4 SCC 37
The
Supreme Court extended the right to speedy medical assistance to workers.
|
Francis
Coralie v. Union of India, AIR
1978 SC 597
The
Supreme Court extended the right to basic necessities such as adequate
nutrition, shelter, free movement, expressing oneself etc as part of
fundamental rights.
|
Chameli
Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.,
(1996) 2 SCC 549.
The
Court held that the right to shelter is a fundamental right available to
every
citizen
under Article 21 of the Constitution.
|
PUDR
v. Union of India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1437.
Right
to minimum wage is part of fundamental rights protected under the
Constitution.
|
Consumer
Research Centre v. Union ofIndia
1995 3 SCC 42
The
court required that compulsory health insurance be provided for every worker
in order to implement the worker’s fundamental right to health.
|
Kirloskar
Brothers Ltd. v. Employee’s State Insurance Corporation , (1996) 2 SCC 682.
The
right to health is a fundamental right of worker, and should be provided for
both state and private employers.
|
Pt.
Parmahand Katara v. Union of India & others
, AIR 1989 SC 2039.
A
doctor at a government hospital has the duty under article 21 of the
constitution to provide medical care regardless of whether the person is
innocent or criminally liable under the penal codes.
|
State
of Maharastra v. Manubhai Pragji Vashi,
A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1.
The
court held that the state government, in concurrence with the concerned
university, the Bar Council of India, and the State Bar Council and other
competent bodies or persons, should take the necessary steps to ensure high
standards to achieve excellence in legal education.
|
Indra
Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992)
3 S.C.C. 212
Holding
that laws and measures that compensate for past discrimination are a means of
achieving equality.
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JURISPRUDENCE (Landmark Cases in Supreme Court of india)
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